The signed DDH protocol as described in [G] features two roles, P and S. Each role is associated to a secret key (skP and skS).
We consider multiple sessions but two agents only (one agent for the role P and one agent for the role S) and show the strong secrecy of the shared key.
signed-ddh-S.sp
, we show that the key gab as computed by S is indistinguishable from g^k with k fresh (system secretS).signed-ddh-P.sp
, we show that the key gab as computed by P is indistinguishable from g^k with k fresh (system secretP).[G] ISO/IEC 9798-3:2019, IT Security techniques – Entity authentication – Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques.
Declarations are identical to the ones in signed-ddh-P.sp
.
The system secretS
is the counterpart of the system secretP
defined in the file signed-ddh-P.sp
.
This time, we add an output at the end of the role of S.
In the proof of strong secrecy for the system secretS
, we will use the following property, stating that whenever S accepts a message from P, this message is of the form <<_,x>,_>
where x = g^a(i)
.
We show the counterpart of the property strongSecP
, this time for the system secretS
. The proof is carried out exactly in the same way.