The signed DDH protocol as described in [G] features two roles, P and S. Each role is associated to a secret key (skP and skS).
We consider multiple sessions but two agents only (one agent for the role P and one agent for the role S) and show the strong secrecy of the shared key.
signed-ddh-S.sp, we show that the key gab as computed by S is indistinguishable from g^k with k fresh (system secretS).signed-ddh-P.sp, we show that the key gab as computed by P is indistinguishable from g^k with k fresh (system secretP).[G] ISO/IEC 9798-3:2019, IT Security techniques – Entity authentication – Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques.
Declarations are identical to the ones in signed-ddh-P.sp.
The system secretS is the counterpart of the system secretP defined in the file signed-ddh-P.sp.
This time, we add an output at the end of the role of S.
In the proof of strong secrecy for the system secretS, we will use the following property, stating that whenever S accepts a message from P, this message is of the form <<_,x>,_> where x = g^a(i).
We show the counterpart of the property strongSecP, this time for the system secretS. The proof is carried out exactly in the same way.